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Foreword
Nearly four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers marked the start of the financial crisis of 2008 
and 2009, the global economy once again faces a complex situation originating in the industrialized 
world. This time the epicentre is the euro zone, where several economies are in a deep recession 
and their governments are hard-pressed to reconcile the need to resume growth with the urgency of 
reducing their high deficits and debt burdens. The resulting global economic uncertainty and turmoil 
are sapping a global recovery that was already the weakest in 40 years. 
On the occasion of the thirty-fourth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), to be held in San Salvador from 27 to 31 August 2012, the Commission considered 
it timely to provide the governments and other economic actors in the region with this brief report on 
the complex international scenario and its potential consequences for the region. The report has two 
parts. The first examines the current international situation and the outlook for the global economy, 
focusing on more structural, medium-term issues. The second part assesses the potential impacts for 
the region in the short run and gauges the available space for deploying countercyclical policies.  
Turmoil in the euro zone is, so far, being transmitted to Latin America and the Caribbean primarily 
through the channel of international trade, in the form of falling demand for the region’s exports of 
goods and services. The region’s exports to the European Union were already down by 5% in the first 
half of 2012. Add to this a downtick in commodity prices, the ebbing flow of remittances from Europe 
and a certain degree of financial volatility associated with heightened perceived risk. Nevertheless, 
this scenario has not hampered the region’s access to international capital markets nor triggered a 
significant drop in inward direct investment.
The United States is performing better than the euro zone, but its recovery is still fragile. Its economy 
is threatened by a set of tax increases and spending cuts equal to 4.7% of GDP that will automatically 
take effect on 1 January 2013 unless Congress reaches a political agreement for postponing part of 
these measures. Absent an agreement, the United States economy could slide back into recession in 
the first quarter of 2013.
Over the next few years the developing countries, in particular China and the other emerging 
economies of Asia, will continue to be the main engine of the global economy and trade; the industrialized 
countries will likely see slow, volatile growth. The latter need to make strides in household and public 
debt reduction. This process, which could take three to five more years, would involve continued 
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financial constraints, stringent fiscal and public debt consolidation requirements, short and uneven 
recoveries, high unemployment and substantial public sector intervention in the financial sector 
and the economy. 
Overall —and with the marked exception of the Caribbean— the countries of the region have 
space for implementing countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies enabling them to face temporary 
external shocks originating in the industrialized economies. But a prolonged global economic 
slowdown would limit the scope of those countercyclical policy measures. 
The issues set out in this report will be examined in greater detail in two flagship ECLAC 
publications that are soon to be released: Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean and 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy.
Alicia Bárcena
Executive Secretary
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
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1. The main engines of the global economy are slowing while more storm clouds gather
 ■ The international economic scenario is growing more 
complicated. Economic growth projections were revised 
downwards in mid-2012. Compared with projections from 
early in the year, they point to euro zone stagnation giving 
way to recession in the second half of the year, while the 
recovery in the United States falters and the slowdown in 
China steepens. In July 2012, the United Nations projected 
2.5% growth for 2012, down slightly from 2.8% in 2011. 
But this projection is based on a rather optimistic set of 
assumptions.1
 ■ After recovering in 2010, world trade growth is cooling. On 
the heels of the strong post-crisis rally in 2010, when trade 
volume climbed by nearly 14%, expansion slowed to 5% in 
2011 (WTO, 2012). For 2012, the World Trade Organization 
expects that world trade volume will increase by only 3.7%, 
below the 5.1% average for the past two decades.
 ■ There are more clouds on the horizon. Tensions in the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf area are threatening oil 
price stability. A price spike for non-economic reasons 
would make a global recession more likely. The 6% jump 
in world food prices in July —the largest since 2009— is 
additional cause for concern. The drought in the United 
States, production setbacks in the Russian Federation and 
unseasonable rainfall in Brazil have pushed these prices 
steeply up, particularly in the case of grains, which have 
risen 17%.
1 The main assumptions are: there will be no financial disruption in the 
euro zone; a political agreement will be reached in the United States 
for postponing some of the fiscal cutbacks and raising the public debt 
ceiling; and countercyclical policies in the emerging economies will 
revive the economy in the second half of the year. The likelihood of 
all three happening is low.
 Figure 1 












































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, World Trade Monitor, and Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECDStat” [online database] http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx [date of reference: 6 July 2012].
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For the South, the decline in 2009 was less sharp, the recovery has been faster, and 
growth through 2017 is projected to be more than twice the pace in the North
2. 
 ■ After the crisis that shook the global economy in 2009, the 
developing economies (the “South”) have posted a stronger 
recovery than the advanced economies (the “North”). But 
the difficulties facing the industrialized economies have 
spilled over into the South in 2012. The South, led by China, 
has differed from the North in that the crisis has not been as 
deep, the recovery has been faster and GDP and trade have 
grown more briskly. This performance helped the countries 
of the South regain pre-crisis trade levels in 29 months while 
the countries of the North have not yet fully recovered, 55 
months after the subprime crisis broke out. As the demand 
for imports falls and financial conditions in the North worsen, 
the developing economies are seeing a slowdown in 2012. 
Nevertheless, projections show that over the coming five 
years the pace of growth in the countries of the South will be 
at least double that of the countries of the North. 
 ■ In any event, the general differences between the economies 
of the North and the South mask considerable heterogeneity 
within each group. In the North, the greatest heterogeneity 
is in Europe, where Germany is in the best position. While 
it is being affected by the depressed context in the region, 
German exports outside Europe are benefiting from the 
euro’s falling value against the dollar and the yuan. Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden are in a 
similar position. On the other hand, countries like Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are in a deep recession 
exacerbated by sweeping fiscal austerity measures. As for the 
South, there are marked differences between the BRICs (Brazil, 
Russian Federation, India and China): economic expansion 
is moderating in China and India whereas economic activity 
in Brazil cooled markedly and then resumed growth in the 
second half of 2012.
 Figure 2 
Selected groups: gross domestic product, exports and imports of 
goods and services, 2001-2017
(Constant growth rate)
A. Advanced economies
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, April 2012, and July 2012 update.
Note: the dashed lines refer to IMF projections.
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3. Compared with previous recoveries, patterns are markedly different in the North  
and the South 
 Figure 3 





A. Constant GDP in 2005 dollars and purchasing power parity
(Index: crisis year=100)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World dataBank, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2012 and 
Ayan M. Kose, Prakash Loungani and Marco E. Terrones (2012), “Tras la pista de la recuperación mundial”, Finanzas y Desarrollo, June, pages 10 to 13.
Note: 0 is the crisis year; the scale shows years before and after the crisis. The average for earlier recoveries includes the 1982 crises and the 1991 crisis.
          Dashed lines denote IMF projections.
 ■ The current post-crisis period is different, not only 
because the pace of recovery varies between advanced 
countries and developing ones but also because it stands 
in contrast to recoveries from earlier crises such as those 
that broke out in 1982 and 1991. In 2010, the global economy 
recovered from the worst, most synchronous crisis since the 
Second World War at a pace similar to the two preceding 
recoveries. But the pattern in industrialized countries has 
differed sharply from the one seen in developing countries. 
In the advanced economies, GDP and exports have tended 
to recover at the same pace or more slowly than in previous 
recoveries; recovery for both in the developing economies 
has been far faster than in the past. This good performance 
by the developing economies, plus the fact that the advanced 
economies are posting one of the weakest recoveries of 
the post-war period, helps reinforce the perception that 
the developing economies are becoming the drivers of 
global growth.
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4. 5. China’s economy is slowing as key economic reforms are implemented
 ■ China’s twelfth five-year development plan 2011-2015 
highlighted the need to bring vertiginous double-digit 
growth down to a more sustainable 7% while shifting the 
focus from investment and exports to domestic consumption. 
But the unfavourable international economic environment 
is triggering sudden slowdowns in exports and industrial 
activity, to a point that could even endanger the 7.5% 
growth target for 2012. 
 ■ Rising net exports helped widen the trade surplus to 
8% of GDP in 2007. But lower post-crisis demand in the 
industrialized countries, currency appreciation and the 
soaring price of raw materials (of which China is a net 
importer) helped push the surplus, as a percentage of 
GDP, down to below 2% in 2012.
 ■ Export growth continues to slow (as the graph for 
components of final demand and GDP shows). The real 
engine of economic growth in China in recent years has 
been investment, while household consumption accounted 
for only one third of GDP in 2011. 
 ■ Data as of July 2012 show an annualized increase in exports 
of just 1%, a 16% drop in exports to Europe and a 0.6% 
increase in exports to the United States. A sharp drop 
in inflation (from 6.5% in July 2011 to 1.8% in July 2012) 
provides scope for new monetary and credit expansion 
measures in the second half of the year, paired with ongoing 
stimulus measures promoting investment at the local 
government level and supporting private investment with 
tax incentives. The impact of these measures is expected 
to be felt starting late in the third quarter, with growth 
by year-end very close to the target set by the authorities 
in early 2012.   
 Figure 4 
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 Figure 5 
China: growth of export and import values, 2008-2012
(Percentages over year-earlier quarter)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of World Bank, World dataBank, and information provided by the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and the Customs Office of China.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of World Bank, World Development Indicators, and information provided by the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Customs Office of China.
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5. A major challenge for China is to shift its sources of growth from net exports and 
investments to private consumption
 ■ The debate in China is whether the sharp slowdown in exports 
and industrial output will lead to a new countercyclical 
programme of a magnitude similar to that implemented 
in 2008 (US$ 628 billion) to keep growth at around 7%-8%. 
There seems to be enough fiscal and monetary space, but the 
structural conditions do not seem appropriate for repeating 
such an ambitious programme. Although the programme 
was successful in that it enabled the Chinese economy to 
expand by 9.1% in 2009 in the middle of the global crisis, it 
was so big that it impaired bank portfolio quality, increased 
local government debt and encouraged excess capacity in a 
number of key industries (steel, automobiles, cement and 
construction materials). The flood of liquidity exacerbated 
inflationary pressures and created property bubbles in the 
major cities. 
 ■ The directives of the twelfth five-year development plan 
2011-2015 placed high priority on boosting domestic 
consumption and mapping out a more sustainable growth 
pattern. One of the key indicators that the plan seeks to 
change is the overly-high investment rate (which hovered 
in the area of 40% of GDP before the 2008-2009 crisis), by 
correlatively increasing consumption. But the features of the 
stimulus programme deployed in 2008 and 2009 skewed that 
support towards major investments in infrastructure and 
capital-intensive industries and pushed the investment rate 
up to nearly 50% of GDP. The current strategic debate in 
China is, then: (i) whether a new growth stimulus programme 
is needed; (ii) if so, how it can be structured so as to avoid 
overly encouraging investment and its flip side: decreasing 
the share of wages in national income.    
 Figure 6 
Selected countries: gross fixed capital formation as  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World Development Indicators.
 Figure 7 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World dataBank.
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6. 7. The complex economic situation is hampering job recovery in the industrialized 
economies
 ■ One of the biggest challenges in the current situation is 
job recovery, especially in the industrialized countries. 
Many countries saw employment rates improve as the 
economy recovered in 2010, but the 2011 slowdown 
halted forward progress. In all of the major economies, 
the employment-to-population ratio remains below 
2007 levels except in Germany, Brazil and China. This is 
also reflected in persistently high unemployment rates, 
especially in the advanced countries. Through June 2012, 
unemployment in the United States remained above 8%, 
exceeding pre-crisis levels. 
 ■ In June 2012 unemployment in the euro zone was the 
highest in its history (11.2% of the labour force, or 17.8 
million people). In almost all of the euro zone countries, 
unemployment at year-end 2011 was higher than in 2007, 
except for Germany. The most heavily indebted countries 
posted the largest unemployment increases and rates 
in June 2012, owing in part to drastic fiscal cuts: Spain 
(24.8%), Greece (22.5%), Portugal (15.4%) and Ireland 
(14.8%) (Eurostat, 2012). Euro zone unemployment is 
expected to continue to rise and might not stabilize until 
sometime in 2013.
 ■ Overall, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries would need to create 14 million 
jobs in order to return to pre-crisis levels of employment 
(OECD, 2012b). Other worrisome trends are the increase 
in long-term unemployment (35% of total euro zone 
unemployment) and the rate of joblessness among the 
young (United Nations, 2012).
 ■ In the industrialized economies, private consumption is 
the largest component of final demand (between 70% and 
75%). Slow job creation, high unemployment and depressed 
real wages herald serious difficulties for returning to 
pre-crisis rates of growth. And credit expansion will not 
be a substitute for an increase in real wages, as it was in 
the 2000s. A credit-driven revival of private consumption 
cannot be expected until private deleveraging is completed. 
 Figure 8 
Unemployment rates, 1991-2017
A. United States and euro zone, 1991-2017 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2012 Update.
a IMF projections for 2012-2017.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Outlook, 
May 2012 and IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2012.
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7. The industrialized countries have less space for countercyclical policy than in 2009
 ■ The industrialized economies have very little scope for 
addressing a new crisis, for a number of reasons. On the 
monetary stimulus front, interest rates in the United States 
and the euro zone are approaching zero and there have been 
several rounds of quantitative easing. Public debt and fiscal 
deficits are at unsustainable levels in most OECD economies. 
And private debt reduction will take a few more years; this, 
in addition to curbing domestic demand, makes monetary 
policy less effective as a reactivation tool. 
 ■ The emerging countries also have less scope for deploying 
countercyclical measures than in 2009, because earlier 
countercyclical recovery programmes were so successful. 
Some were so big that they fuelled credit booms or inflationary 
pressures and even threatened to create property bubbles. 
Another limiting factor has been emerging throughout 2012: 
worsening terms of trade and falling export values are taking 
a particularly heavy toll on the fiscal balance of minerals-, 
metal- and energy-exporting economies.
 Figure 9 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Bloomberg and International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2012.
a Data for 2012 are projections.
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8. Despite enormous efforts, the euro zone crisis continues and could deepen
 ■ The euro zone approached recession in the second quarter 
of 2012, amid the looming threat of a W-shaped recovery 
or double-dip recession. Technically speaking, the euro 
zone has avoided a recession because economic activity 
was stagnant in the first quarter of 2012. In practical 
terms, though, the euro zone (without Germany) has been 
practically flat since the first quarter of 2008.  
 ■ Despite major agreements, the crisis has not yet been 
defused. The euro-zone summit in late June agreed on 
direct recapitalization of banks without going through 
governments, and on a 120-billion-euro growth stimulus 
programme. Recapitalization would be paired with a single 
banking supervisory mechanism that could take several 
years to become operational. Such a delay would mean 
higher public deficits in the meantime. And the complicated 
details of how to mesh national and European Community 
regulators remain to be fleshed out. Likewise, the resources 
agreed for stimulating growth (1% of the euro zone’s GDP) 
seem too limited in the face of financial uncertainty and 
widespread fiscal austerity. 
 ■ The euro is still under threat. Volatility and financial 
uncertainty are affecting cross-border and interbank credit 
lines in Europe, with the most indebted economies taking 
the hardest hit. Regulators in the more solvent economies are 
pressuring local banks to increase their capital and liquidity 
at the cost of limiting their exposure in the Mediterranean 
countries. Because of the large share of intra-European 
trade, this affects exports throughout the euro zone. The 
major banks and multinational companies are already 
drafting contingency plans for a potential rearrangement 
of the euro zone, as can be seen in the marked scale-back 
of their exposure to the hardest-hit economies, the gradual 
shift of part of their euro assets to dollars and the transfer 
of accounts in euros to economies regarded as safer. These 
processes, which are already being felt in the world’s 
major financial centres, are putting further pressure on 
indebted economies.
 Figure 10 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
Eurostat “National Accounts, Main Tables” [online]   http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/
page/portal/national_accounts/data/main_tables [date of reference: 17 August 2012].
 Figure 11 
Banks in selected countries or groups: loan exposure to selected 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Bank of International Settlements, “Consolidated banking statistics”, table 9E, Foreign 
exposures on selected individual countries, ultimate risk basis [online] http://www.bis.org/
statistics/consstats.htm# [date of reference: 14 August 2012].
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9. Fiscal deficits and public debt in the euro zone pose economic policy dilemmas
 ■ A number of euro zone economies are confronted with a 
thorny economic policy dilemma: fiscal cutbacks versus 
growth. On the one hand, high fiscal deficits and public 
debt in a recession lead investors and analysts to question 
fiscal account sustainability, especially in countries like 
Spain and Italy. These concerns are expressed in higher 
sovereign bond risk premiums for these countries, making 
funding more expensive for them. To mitigate this high 
perceived risk, these countries are undergoing severe 
fiscal consolidation that is dealing a heavy blow to their 
already weakened economies. This upsets investors, 
whose behaviour swings wildly as they press for fiscal 
consolidation while fearing the slower growth it brings 
(Blanchard, 2012). On the other hand, sweeping austerity 
measures in the euro zone could constitute a fallacy of 
composition: fiscal consolidation might make sense for a 
single economy but could turn into an adverse scenario 
if all of the euro zone economies were to implement the 
same policy, especially since nearly two thirds of European 
Union exports go to the European market.
 ■ There is a growing perception that the crisis must be faced 
with a more appropriate mix of austerity and growth if 
a double-dip euro-zone recession is to be warded off. 
The dilemma lies in the fact that, in the short run, fiscal 
consolidation and slower growth drive sovereign debt risk 
premiums up, but, without robust public investment (in 
infrastructure, for example), growth is unlikely to return 
to levels that ensure a stable public debt path.
 Figure 12 
Euro zone and germany: public debt and fiscal balance, 1995-2013
(Percentages of GDP)


















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of information provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2012.
a IFM projections.
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10. 11. Patterns differ among euro zone members
 ■ The difficult overall context in Europe masks substantial 
heterogeneity among individual countries. Germany is in 
the best position: while it is being affected by the depressed 
context in the region, its exports outside Europe are benefiting 
from the euro’s falling value against the dollar and the yuan. 
And the crisis is helping Germany’s public accounts because 
the mounting credit risk of a number of euro zone countries 
boosts demand for German bonds and pushes their real yields 
into negative territory. This is helping bring down Germany’s 
deficit, which is likely to balance out in 2013.2 Other countries, 
such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, are in a similar position. 
 ■ On the other hand, countries like Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain are in a deep recession exacerbated by 
stringent fiscal austerity measures. As a result, risk premiums 
for Greece, Italy and Spain are spiralling up to unprecedented, 
unsustainable levels.
 ■ In short, widespread fiscal austerity has impacts ranging from 
positive financial externalities for Germany and the countries 
of the North to a worsening economic scenario in the South. 
This is one of the economic and political divides between 
Northern Europe and Southern Europe that make it hard to 
reach agreements leading to an orderly exit from the crisis.
 Figure 13 
Europe (selected euro zone countries): credit default swap risk 
























































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Bloomberg.
2 Spiegel Online, “Eurocrisis Will Help Germany Balance its Budget” 
[online] http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/euro-crisis-
helps-germany-by-lowering-borrowing-costs-a-838880.html [date 
of reference: 21 July 2012].
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11. In the United States, recovery from the subprime crisis is the slowest and most 
vulnerable of all recoveries since the 1970s
 ■ Economic growth in the United States slowed to a modest 
1.5% in the second quarter of 2012. Job creation has slackened, 
from 250,000 jobs between December 2011 and February 2012 
to 100,000 between March and June and only 80,000 in June 
2012. At this pace of job recovery, pre-crisis employment 
levels will not be regained until 2025 (Stiglitz, 2012).
 ■ These figures show that the United States is in a period of 
slow, vulnerable growth five years after the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis. Despite forceful revitalization programmes, 
this recovery is proving to be the slowest since the 1970s.
 ■ Annual growth during the recovery (between mid-2009 
and 2012) is averaging 2.4%, which is low in view of the 
magnitude of the stimulus measures implemented. This 
shows that the fiscal deficit accounts for the bulk of economic 
activity in times of sharp private debt reduction. Indeed, 
the financial balance of the private sector turned from a 
deficit equal to 2.4% of GDP in the third quarter of 2007 to 
a surplus of 8.2% of GDP in early 2012. This massive shift, 
of more than 10 percentage points of GDP, would have 
triggered a severe depression were it not for increased fiscal 
spending (Wolf, 2012). 
 Figure 14 






























































Gross domestic product International trade 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook, April 2012 update and July 2012 update.
Note: Data from 2012 onwards are IMF projections.
 Figure 15 
United States: cumulative growth in the four years after the crisis
(Index: crisis year=1)








Crisis Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World dataBank; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, April 
2012 update and July 2012 update.
Note: Starting in 2011, total trade refers only to exports of goods and services.
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12. 13. Late this year the United States will face a fiscal cliff with significant implications  
for growth potential in 2013
 ■ There is a real threat of another United States recession 
in 2013. Automatic tax hikes and spending cuts totalling 
US$ 560 billion (4.7% of GDP) will be triggered in January 
2013 unless Congress reaches an agreement for postponing 
some of the measures.
 ■ If all of the measures were to take effect the economy would 
slow dramatically, with growth projected at just 0.5% for 
2013 and the economy expected to contract during the first 
half of the year (Congressional Budget Office, CBO, 2012). 
The International Monetary Fund (2012b) projects that the 
economy will stall in 2013 if there is no legislative agreement 
and all of these fiscal measures take effect. 
 ■ The United States economy will start 2013 with growth in 
the area of 1.5%; fiscal matters in need of Congressional 
agreement equal some 4.7% of GDP. There is little likelihood 
of legislative agreement on the entire amount, so even in the 
most optimistic of scenarios with partial legislative agreements 
the most likely outcome would be modest growth in 2013 
(Roubini, 2012). The most recent International Monetary 
Fund projection suggests 2.3% growth for 2013, but this 
forecast hinges on best-case assumptions concerning this 
fiscal debate as well as the response to the euro crisis. This 
last point is a relevant one, because the slowdown in Europe 
is starting to dampen exports from the United States. 
 Figure 16 





















































Public debt (left scale) Fiscal balance (right scale)
Source: Congressional Budget Office  (CBO), “Economic Effects of Reducing the Fiscal 
Restraint That Is Scheduled to Occur in 2013”, May 2012. 
 Table 1 
United States: expected fiscal cuts in 2013





Deficit in 2012 1 171 ...
Deficit in 2013 612 ...
Consolidation 559 ...
Expiring tax cuts 399 3.3
Effect of automatic cuts in federal spending 65 0.5
Unemployment benefit cuts 26 0.2
Medicare reduction a 11 0.1
Other adjustments 105 0.9
Economic feedback effect b -47 -0.4
Total 560 4.7
Source: Congressional Budget Office  (CBO), “Economic Effects of Reducing the Fiscal 
Restraint That Is Scheduled to Occur in 2013”, May 2012. 
a Medicare is a health insurance programme for those aged over 65.
b The economic feedback effect is the effect that slower growth in 2013 has on tax revenue and 
fiscal spending. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/FiscalRestraint_0.
pdf [date of reference: 6 August 2012].
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13. The complex process of household debt reduction in the industrialized countries is 
constraining economic growth
 ■ The difficult recovery in the industrialized countries is 
the expected outcome of a crisis whose primary causes 
included an unsustainable increase in gross household 
debt. During the five-year run-up to the outbreak of the 2008 
crisis, average gross household debt rose by 39 percentage 
points to reach 138% of income. In a number of European 
countries it topped 200% (IMF, 2012a). When the 2008 crisis 
drove home values down, many households saw their equity 
fall in relation to what they owed. Moreover, falling income 
and rising unemployment made it increasingly hard to make 
mortgage payments.
 ■ Debt reduction is concentrated in lower-income households 
that spend a high percentage of their income; this inevitably 
has a substantial negative macroeconomic impact. In order 
to reduce their debt burden, households have to cut back on 
consumption and increase savings as they discover that their 
homes were overvalued, access to credit is constrained and 
future income expectations are dampened. Consumption is 
also impacted by heightened economic uncertainty, which 
encourages preventive saving (IMF, 2012a).
 Figure 17 
Selected industrialized countries: household debt, 2000, 2007 
and 2011












































2000 2007 2011 (third quarter)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD World Economic 
Outlook, May 2012.
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14. 15. Recessions triggered by financial crises due to overindebtedness are especially 
costly and complex to address
 ■ Recessions triggered by overindebtedness tend to set 
off sharper drops in GDP, private consumption and 
employment than those caused by other factors, and they 
depress economic activity for at least five years (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2010; McKinsey, 2012). Recoveries from crises 
caused by overindebtedness are also long because of 
subsequent government interventions to rescue financial 
institutions and support families. They leave a legacy of 
high fiscal deficits and public debt that take years to bring 
down. Moreover, in a context of private debt reduction, 
monetary and financial stimulus measures are of limited 
effectiveness, because the funds provided by the financial 
system to stimulate aggregate demand tend to return to the 
financial system through debt paydowns.  
 ■ To exit the current crisis, families in many countries need 
to go through forced debt settlement or bankruptcy. The 
country that has made the most progress in deleveraging 
is the United States, where bankruptcies accounted for two 
thirds of debt reduction between 2008 and 2011 (McKinsey, 
2012). It is estimated that by late 2013 the private sector in 
the United States will be returning to its medium-term debt 
trend, which would also allow a return to faster growth. By 
contrast, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom still have 
high private debt payments that are a severe drag on private 
consumption and its contribution to growth.
 Figure 18 























Financial institutions Non-financial private sector Households
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
information provided by the United States Federal Reserve System.
a Does not include asset-backed securities, to avoid double counting of underlying loans. 
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15. Successful deleveraging processes have some things in common
 ■ Finland, Sweden and the Republic of Korea are examples of 
countries that successfully deleveraged after a deep financial 
crisis (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012). Some of the similarities 
in these cases are: (i) rapid resolution of bad loans; (ii) robust 
export performance supported by significant devaluation; 
(iii) rapid expansion of private investment; (iv) structural 
reforms to promote productivity and competition (in the 
Nordic countries, entry into the European Union and retail 
sector deregulation; in the Republic of Korea, restructuring 
corporate conglomerates and further opening the economy 
to foreign direct investment); and (v) stabilization of real 
estate market prices and resumption of new home sales. 
Another similarity is that fiscal deleveraging took place only 
after growth had resumed, driven by exports and private 
investment. In other words, fiscal deleveraging came in 
the final years of private debt reduction. In the countries 
examined, the process took between five and seven years. 
This suggests that the United States is only just beginning 
the process, as the figures suggest.
 Figure 19 
Selected countries: gross fixed capital formation eight years 
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 Figure 20 
Selected countries: exports eight years before and after the crisis
(Index: crisis year=100)
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 Figure 21 
Selected countries: public debt eight years before and after  
the crisis
 (Percentages of GDP)








Finland SwedenRep. of KoreaUnited States
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World dataBank [online database].
Note: Year 0 is the crisis year —1994 for Finland and Sweden, 1999 for the Republic of Korea 
and 2009 for the United States.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database].
Note: Year 0 is the crisis year —1994 for Finland and Sweden, 1999 for the Republic of Korea 
and 2009 for the United States.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database].
Note: Year 0 is the crisis year —1994 for Finland and Sweden, 1999 for the Republic of Korea 
and 2009 for the United States.
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16. 17. 2013-2020 will be a cycle of slow growth in the industrialized economies and higher 
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 ■ For 2012-2017, many analysts forecast continued slow 
growth in the industrialized countries (the “North”) 
and just a slight cooldown in the developing countries 
(the “South”). The United Nations (2012) projects annual 
average growth of 2.5% for the countries of the North and 
5.6% for the countries of the South between 2013 and 2020. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012a) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2012) project even faster growth for the South. 
According to all of these organizations, the United States 
is likely to perform the best among countries of the North. 
In the South, between 2013 and 2017 China is expected to 
continue to post the fastest expansion, at a projected annual 
rate of nearly 8%. Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean 
should grow by 4%-5%, slower than the pace forecast for 
developing Asia.
 ■ In 2011-2017, developing Asia is expected to account for 
nearly half of global economic growth. Latin America and 
the Caribbean are forecast to contribute more than 8.3%, 
slightly more than Eastern Europe but nearly twice the 
contribution made by Africa. The industrialized countries 
together are forecast to account for less than a third.
 Map  
Contribution to projected global growth, 2011-2017
(Percentage points)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012.
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17. Fiscal consolidation and population ageing will be another drag on growth  
in the industrialized economies
 ■ A number of industrialized countries (not just European 
ones, but Australia and the United States as well) need to 
rein in their public debt. To do so, the governments are 
reducing the primary balance (before interest payments). 
The fiscal cutback is expected to exceed 4% of potential GDP 
in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Australia and Italy between 2011 
and 2013, according to estimates from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2012). Most of 
the adjustment in these five countries will be in the form of 
spending cuts. The exception is Italy, where the bulk will 
be from tax increases. 
 ■ Fiscal consolidation slows growth. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) estimates 
that reducing the primary balance as a percentage of GDP 
by 1 percentage point would reduce GDP growth by 
approximately 0.5%. In the five countries with cutbacks in 
excess of 4% of potential GDP, GDP growth would therefore 
be some 2% lower in 2011-2013.
 ■ The future costs associated with population ageing in terms 
of higher spending on public health and on pensions pose 
another challenge for the fiscal consolidation required in 
the industrialized countries. Higher spending on health 
might be desirable, but funding it could be difficult. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(2012) anticipates that increased health spending and the 
spending associated with long-term care for older persons 
would increase the annual fiscal cost by an average of 1.5% 
of GDP. The additional cost is for pensions and varies widely 
among countries.
 Figure 22  
Selected industrialized countries: fiscal consolidation as projected 
by change in the primary fiscal balance, 2011-2013
(Percentage of potential GDP)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Outlook, 
May 2012.
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18. 19. Burgeoning South-South trade is a structural trend that the features of the crisis  
are reinforcing
 ■ Faster growth in the developing countries than in the 
industrialized ones over the past few decades has rearranged 
international trade flows. Since the mid-1980s the developing 
countries’ share of world exports has soared; exports between 
developing countries now exceed their exports to developed 
countries. Asia’s booming trade, both intraregional and with 
other developing regions, accounts for much of this shift.
 ■ The flip side is the plummeting share of trade among 
developed countries as a percentage of the world total: from 
more than 60% in 1985 to less than 40% in 2010.   
 ■ If trade flows follow this same trend over the next few years, 
by around 2017 trade among developing countries could 
account for a larger proportion of global trade value than 
trade among developed countries.
 Figure 23  
developed and developing country exports, 1985-2020 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations commodity trade database (COMTRADE). 
a Figures for 2011 onwards are ECLAC projections.
 Figure 24  
World: distribution of exports, 1985 and 2010


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations commodity trade database (COMTRADE). 
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19. The developing countries are also raising their profile as receivers and senders 
of global foreign direct investment
 Figure 25  
developing and transition economies: share of foreign direct 
investment inflows, 1990-2014 a






























































Share of developing and transition economies (right scale)
Share of developing and transition economies without China 
(left scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTADSTAT database and 
World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (UNCTAD/
WIR/2012), Geneva, July 2012.
a Figures for 2012 to 2014 are projections.
 ■ Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows continued to recover 
in 2011; low growth is expected in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2012). 
Developing countries and transition economies combined 
received slightly more than half of inward FDI flows in 
2011 and are expected to maintain this share through 2014. 
The two developing regions topping the list of FDI recipients 
are Asia and Oceania (led by China and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China) and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (where Brazil is the main recipient, as well 
as the fifth worldwide in 2011). 
 ■ The developing countries’ share of outward foreign 
investment, which surged during the past decade, dropped 
to 23% in 2011 after reaching an all-time high of 28% in 2010.
 ■ These trends towards a higher share of developing countries 
in global FDI flows in both directions still hold if China is 
not included in this category of countries.
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20. The stagnant external environment is cooling economic growth in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
 ■ In aggregate terms, the complex international situation and 
developments in individual countries weighed on the region’s 
economic activity throughout 2011. The slowdown halted in 
the first quarter of 2012 but resumed to a certain degree in 
the second quarter, signalling a potential scenario in which 
growth could be slower than in the past for a prolonged 
period. It is therefore estimated that, at 3.2%, the region’s 
economy will expand less than in 2011.
 ■ The contribution that the components of aggregate demand 
make to the region’s GDP has varied widely among the 
countries, but there are some factors in common. The 
contribution of private consumption fell steadily in 2011 but 
stabilized in the first quarter of 2012 albeit at a lower level 
than in prior years. The contribution of public consumption 
rose slightly, as did investment.
 ■ There are some differences among subregions. Average 
growth was relatively stable in Mexico and Central America 
between the third quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 
2012; the contribution by private and public consumption was 
positive and growing, and the contribution by net exports 
was positive. South America saw a slowing GDP growth 
trend that sharpened in the third quarter despite a growing 
contribution by investment and public consumption. Rising 
imports reflected the increase in investment, whereas export 
volume slackened. As a result, the negative contribution of net 
exports to GDP growth increased in the first quarter of 2012.
 Figure 26 
Selected regions: gdp variation and contribution to growth  
of the components of aggregate demand
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
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21. Growth in the region slowed in the second quarter of 2012
 ■ Preliminary data for the second quarter of the year show that 
economic activity resumed the slowdown that had seemed 
to halt in the first quarter. GDP growth (over the previous 
quarter 3) is estimated at just under 0.5% —markedly below 
the rates posted since the second quarter of 2009. This cooling 
is also seen in the indicators of sectoral activity available for 
the second quarter of the year, especially in the industrial 
activity trend.
 Figure 27 
Latin America and the Caribbean: gross domestic product,  
2007-2012
























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
a Estimate.
 Figure 28 
Latin America: twelve-month changes in industrial production 

























Industrial production index Moving three-month average 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
3 Seasonally adjusted series.
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22. 23. The labour markets continue to improve
 ■ As of mid-2012, on a regional aggregate basis employment 
was rising steadily and the unemployment rate was 
falling. The predominant pattern was moderately rising 
real wages, making the labour markets one of the drivers of 
growing domestic demand. Information available for 2012 
to date indicates that job generation was led by an increase 
in wage employment, showing that business expectations 
were still relatively optimistic. Nonetheless, in a number 
of countries slower growth and gloomier expectations led 
to greater caution in new hiring and, as a result, slower 
formal job generation.
 ■ An examination of year-on-year employment rate variation 
also reveals differences. The rate has slowed sharply in 
Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay after climbing in 2009-
2010; in Colombia and Mexico employment rose at rates 
similar to or even higher than in preceding years. In Brazil, 
the increase in employment was the same as the average 
for 2011 but lower than in 2010.
 ■ In an environment of contained inflation, average wages 
continued to post modest real gains. However, international 
price patterns for some food items could push up their price 
for consumers and impact the purchasing power of lower-
income segments of the population. An external context of 
slow economic growth in the region’s main trading partners 
over the next few years would decrease business labour 
demand. This would, above all, curb wage job generation 
and shift a larger share of job creation to low-productivity 
activities as pressure from material household needs 
increased the labour supply. The recent steady downtrend 
in the unemployment rate would also slow. 
 Figure 29 
Latin America (selected countries): year-on-year growth 
in employment covered by social security 
(Fourth quarter 2009 to second quarter 2012)
-4
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
 Figure 30 
Latin America (selected countries): year-on-year variation 




















































2010 2011 First semester 2012 b
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
a The bar for the first half of 2012 is for the first quarter of 2012. 
b Preliminary data.
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23. Except for some food items, raw materials prices are falling
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, “Pink Sheet”,  August 2012.
 ■ So far in 2012, commodity prices are below the average for 
2011. Food prices are the exception, especially in the case of 
grains (soybeans, rice and maize): the downtrend through 
January 2012 reversed in February because of specific supply 
situations. Commodity price patterns affect the economies 
of Latin America and the Caribbean in different ways. The 
terms of trade have worsened for those countries of the 
region most specialized in commodity exports (chiefly, the 
countries of South America); net hydrocarbon importing 
countries benefited more from falling energy prices. And 
while the countries of Central America benefited from 
falling fuel prices, they have been negatively impacted by 
the rising price of food.
 ■ Although international commodity prices have declined 
(especially for metals, minerals and energy), they are still 
well above the levels posted before 2003, when they began 
their steady climb.
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24. The region’s exports will grow far more slowly in 2012 than in 2011
 ■ Growth of the region’s goods exports is expected to slow 
from 23% in 2011 to about 5% in 2012. Declining external 
demand has cooled the growth of exports from the region, 
but the most important factor has been an unfavourable 
price trend for the principal export commodities.
 ■ The global economic slowdown is also reflected in the 
region’s exports according to destination. Export value to 
the United States has held relatively steady since the third 
quarter of 2011, thanks to slow growth in the United States 
and the fact that manufactured products account for the 
largest share. On the other hand, the economic crisis in the 
European Union has pushed its external demand down and 
fed a downtrend in export value from Latin America and 
the Caribbean since mid- 2011.
 ■ The situation is similar for the region’s exports to Asia, 
although in this case the impact has come more from 
declining prices because the region’s exports to Asia are, 
largely, commodities.
 Figure 32 
Latin America: year-on-year variation in export volume  
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Volume Price
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Boletín 
estadístico de comercio exterior de bienes en América Latina y el Caribe. Segundo trimestre de 
2012”, No. 7, Santiago, Chile, 2012.
a Projection.
 Figure 33 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Boletín 
estadístico de comercio exterior de bienes en América Latina y el Caribe. Segundo trimestre de 
2012”, No. 7, Santiago, Chile, 2012. 
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25. The heaviest slowdown in the region’s exports and remittance income  
has been vis-à-vis the European Union
 ■ While exports from Latin America to all destinations are 
slackening overall, the cooldown has been sharper in the 
case of exports to the European Union: in the second quarter 
of 2012 export value was down by nearly 11% over the same 
period in 2011.
 ■ The region’s exports to the United States and Asia, as well 
as its intraregional exports, also grew at a slower pace in 
the first quarter of 2012, with rises of 8.3%, 17.7% and 10.6% 
respectively, versus increases of 23.9%, 30% and 20.5%, 
respectively, in the first quarter of 2011.
 ■ Migrant remittances are another channel through which 
the European Union crisis is transmitted to the region. An 
examination of remittance patterns during the first quarter of 
2012 for a set of countries in the region shows that in two of 
the three countries posting declines (Ecuador and Colombia) 
the principal migrant destination is Spain.
 Table 2  
European Union: variation in value of imports from  









Brazil -27.7% 28.2% 16.6% -1.0% -40.0% 28.5% 1.4% -11.9%
Chile -33.5% 25.9% 14.8% -14.5% -9.2% 11.7% 23.0% -34.3%
Honduras 7.4% 17.9% 44.8% 16.4% 9.9% 1.2% -5.4% -6.3%
Argentina -22.8% 13.4% 14.2% -2.3% -27.1% 4.5% 4.8% 4.6%
Uruguay -20.0% 44.7% 1.7% -9.1% -21.7% 79.2% -8.7% -13.9%
Costa Rica -12.4% 100.1% 7.5% 38.2% -9.8% 5.7% 3.2% 3.4%
Peru -17.0% 61.4% 22.8% 9.5% -8.2% 30.2% 27.3% 35.5%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Eurostat.
 Figure 34  
Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries): variation  
in income from migrant remittances, 2010-2012 
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures. 
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26. 27. Despite global financial turmoil the region has, overall, maintained its access  
to the international financial markets
 ■ For Latin America and the Caribbean, turmoil in the 
international financial markets has meant steadily increasing 
perceived sovereign risk. The sharp decline after the outbreak 
of the 2008-2009 global crisis was followed by a gradual 
rise beginning in 2011. Current risk levels are substantially 
below those at the peak of the global crisis, although they 
are higher than pre-crisis levels. At the same time, measures 
of risk that are comparable with those of the euro zone 
countries show that in a number of cases the region continues 
to have lower risk levels. In this environment, the region 
has maintained fluid access to the international financial 
markets, where its bond issues have gone from a monthly 
average of US$ 7.660 billion in 2011 to US$ 9.779 billion so 
far in 2012 and have grown across the board (sovereign, 
quasi-sovereign, corporate and bank bonds).
 ■ These factors combined enabled the region to continue 
to strengthen its external position during the first half of 
2012 as, with certain exceptions, it continued to build up 
international reserves. In April 2012 gross reserves stood at 
a new record high of more than US$ 800 billion.
 Figure 35  
Latin America: bond issues on international markets










































































Private Banks Sovereign Quasi-sovereign
EMBI+ Latin America (right axis)a
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
figures from LatinFinance (bonds database), JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch.
a Emerging Markets Bonds Index. 
 Table 3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: country risk (EMBIg)
(Basis points)
Annual average 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 January February March April May June July
Argentina 327 871 1 174 696 701 840 843 880 962 1 236 1 088 1 087
Belize 484 827 1 421 818 1 011 1 466 1 836 1 665 1 732 1 694 1 691 1 765
Brazil 182 293 300 209 195 225 197 177 188 244 208 183
Chile 103 216 206 131 140 162 160 148 156 191 167 154
Colombia 163 301 320 194 166 200 171 141 152 207 158 140
Ecuador 661 1 398 2 016 954 819 818 788 824 792 948 892 852
El Salvador 164 419 488 322 383 485 473 453 470 508 480 471
Jamaica 373 545 845 492 485 669 625 579 610 653 640 662
Mexico 129 251 298 191 188 229 209 185 187 249 202 176
Panama 157 299 304 181 172 212 180 153 158 218 187 169
Peru 141 276 282 179 194 221 195 157 166 216 174 145
Dominican Republic 212 680 373 453 557 543 506 513 532 488 481
Trinidad and Tobago 166 378 868
Uruguay 200 417 412 219 200 222 206 173 190 251 197 172
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 352 877 1 254 1 107 1 213 1 155 916 939 926 1 209 1 129 1 099
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (15 countries) 254 537 728 433 451 533 524 499 514 597 550 540
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global).
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27. Marked prudence has guided monetary policy reference rate management 
in the region
 ■ In an external environment marked by high uncertainty, 
caution has guided monetary policy management, particularly 
in the face of high perceived volatility in the global financial 
market. Most central bank boards kept their policy rates 
steady; any changes have tended to be downward.
 ■ Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Guatemala and the Dominican 
Republic lowered their rates in the second quarter of 2012. But 
if aggregate external demand slows further and spìlls over 
into components of domestic demand, there are likely to be 
larger downward movements to avoid a further cooling of 
aggregate domestic demand and thus of economic activity.
 ■ For several of the countries of the region, current policy rate 
levels are, on average, 74% of the level recorded in October 
2008. This, along with potential inflationary pressures from 
rising food prices, could be interpreted as narrowing the 
space for rate cuts to spur aggregate demand.
 Figure 36  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
32
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
 Figure 37  
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected subregions): year-on-
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28. Domestic lending continues to surge
 ■ Domestic lending continues to surge in most of the region, 
although this growth has been tending to slow in a number 
of countries in the first two quarters of 2012. In Argentina, 
Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, the cooldown 
began in the second quarter of 2010 but has gathered 
momentum in the first half of 2012. Lending continues to 
expand in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Chile: at 
the end of the first half of 2012 the 12-month increases were 
54.8% and 20.6%, respectively. The expansion of lending 
in the countries of Central America tended to stabilize at a 
medium level. In the economies of the Caribbean, domestic 
lending continued to grow, albeit somewhat more slowly 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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29. Trends have been uneven as regards international reserve accumulation
 ■ In the first half of 2012, international reserves swelled 
considerably in some countries but contracted in others. 
With the exception of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chile and Paraguay, the South American countries built 
up international reserves significantly in the first semester. 
Reserves rose over end-2011 levels by 32.9% in Ecuador, 
17.4% in Peru and 17.2% in Uruguay. Conversely, in the 
Caribbean, reserves posted a first semester decline of 15.4% 
in Jamaica and 12.0% in the Dominican Republic.
 ■ International reserves have played a key role in the region 
in alleviating the impacts of sudden stops in international 
financial flows, by helping to finance international trade 
and providing central banks with liquidity to inject into 
the system through foreign-exchange market interventions. 
Thus far in 2012, international reserves are much higher 
than they were in the run-up to the 2008-2009 crisis. Import 
growth makes the reserves-to-imports ratio similar for the 
two periods, however.
 Figure 38  
Latin America and the Caribbean: variation in international 
reserves, June 2011-June 2012
(Percentage)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
officia l Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
 Figure 39  

















































































Post-crisis average (Q1 2012 – Q2 2012) June 2012
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
officia l Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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30. Several of the region’s currencies have appreciated in 2012
 ■ With financial markets remaining volatile and the countries 
of the region offering higher relative returns than other parts 
of the world, especially Europe, some of the currencies in the 
region have appreciated strongly. This has been especially 
true for countries that are more integrated into international 
financial markets, except for Brazil. The Colombian peso 
appreciated by 7.5% and the Chilean peso by 7.2% between 
December 2011 and July 2012, for example. Some countries 
have adopted measures to discourage short-term capital 
inflows and reduce dollarization: accordingly, the Brazilian 
real and the Uruguayan peso depreciated in nominal terms 
by 10.2% and 7.0%, respectively, in the same period.
 ■ The path of the nominal exchange rate, added to price 
dynamics, has meant real effective currency appreciation in 
many countries. Between December 2011 and July 2012 the 
real effective exchange rate fell by 8.3% in Colombia and by 
6.2% in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
 Figure 40  
Latin America and the Caribbean: rate of variation in the nominal 
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31. The fiscal accounts are expected to improve in 2012
 ■ The region’s overall fiscal balance in 2011 was similar 
on average to that of 2010, with public revenue climbing 
strongly and by similar percentages of GDP in both years. 
The average overall fiscal balance is expected to improve 
slightly in 2012, with revenues continuing to expand above 
GDP growth and spending tending to slow. The average 
primary balance should therefore turn positive again.
 ■ Public revenues have made a good recovery in most of the 
region’s countries in the past few years and have, in many 
cases, regained the levels seen before the crisis of 2008-2009. 
In 2011, total revenues amounted to 19.7% of GDP, slightly 
more than in 2008. These results owe much to the upturn in 
the terms of trade (in countries whose fiscal revenues are in 
large measure natural-resource-related), and to growth in 
tax receipts on the back of strengthening domestic demand 
and imports.
 ■ The average masks very different situations, however: 
revenues far exceed pre-crisis levels in Argentina and 
Ecuador, but still fall short of these levels in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Chile and Peru.
 Figure 41  
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): 
central government fiscal indicators, 2000-2012


























2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Overall balance (right scale)   
Total revenues (left scale) Total spending (left scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
 Figure 42  
Latin America and the Caribbean: variation in revenues and 










































Other revenues Tax revenues Capital spending
Current spending Primary balance Total spending
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
a  Figures for 2012 are provisional.
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32. 2012 fiscal revenues are projected to just exceed 2011 levels
 ■ Revenues from the export of primary products have 
burgeoned in some countries in the past few years. Steeply 
rising commodity prices have helped to swell central 
governments’ fiscal income, whether directly (from taxation 
and profits of State enterprises in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia) or from taxation of private 
enterprise (withholding tax on exports in Argentina, royalties 
and income tax in Chile and Peru). 
 ■ Total revenues in 2012 are expected to slightly exceed the 
2011 figure as a proportion of GDP in several countries of the 
region. One exception is Chile, where forecasts suggest a dip 
of almost one GDP percentage point in non-tax income, but 
above-GDP growth in receipts from both direct and indirect 
taxes. For Brazil, although GDP growth forecasts have been 
revised downwards, a larger wage bill and falling interest 
rates suggest that tax receipts will hold relatively steady 
and spending should fall sharply by comparison with 2011.
 ■ If commodity prices continue to fall, the effects may start 
to be fully felt in the first semester of 2013 in countries, like 
Chile and Peru, whose revenue relies strongly on direct 
taxation of private mining and drilling enterprises.
 Figure 43  
Latin America and the Caribbean (9 countries a): total fiscal 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total revenues Income from primary products
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
a Includes Argentina (central government), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador (non-financial public sector), Mexico (public sector), Peru, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago.
 Table 4  
Selected countries: fiscal indicators, 2011-2012
(Variations and percentages of GDP)
Revenues Spending Balance
 (Variation in percentages of GDP) 2011 2012
Brazil … … -2.6 -1.4
Chile -1.1 0.5 1.3 -0.3
Colombia 0.9 0.5 -2.8 -2.4
Guatemala … … -2.8 -2.4
Honduras 0.5 -0.4 -4.6 -3.7
Peru 0.1 0.9 1.9 1.1
Uruguay 0.3 1.6 -0.7 -1.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
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33. Public accounts are expected to continue consolidating
 ■ Central government public spending rose on average in 2011, 
although the situation varied across the region. Spending 
rose as a proportion of GDP in Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, but fell in Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and Uruguay. 
Recent forecasts indicate that spending execution for 2012 
will be very much as budgeted and, given that spending 
rises in most budgets differed little from GDP projections 
and were consistent with deficit and public debt targets, 
public spending in relation to GDP should vary little in 2012.
 ■ As the official projections show, the harsh external conditions 
have had little effect on expectations for consolidation of the 
public accounts, since they have no significant impact on 
assumptions associated with revenue projections or with the 
fiscal rules in place in the region. Many ECLAC publications 
have documented the large drop in public debt in relation 
to GDP and the change in public debt composition, with 
domestic debt recently coming to account for a much larger 
share. The region’s external public debt now represents 
around 15% of GDP, compared with 85% in 1990 (ECLAC/
OECD, 2011).
 ■ The first figure compares overall balances in 2011 (flow) and 
the “legacy” effect (debt stock) on the fiscal accounts. The 
results show diverse situations, but without sharp extremes 
and a far cry from the fiscal imbalances being posted in 
OECD. A few countries show an overall fiscal surplus —Chile, 
Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia— but 
in general borrowing needs were quite limited in 2011 and 
remain so in 2012, so the fiscal position is not expected to 
show large variations in borrowing levels. 
 Figure 44  
Latin America and OECd: overall fiscal balance 














































Gross public debt 2011
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
official figures, and OECD.
 Figure 45  
Latin America and the Caribbean: overall fiscal balance 






































Gross public debt 2010
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
official figures, and OECD.
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34. With the exception of most of the Caribbean countries, the region has the fiscal 
space to tackle adversities
 ■ Although the situation is fairly diverse in 19 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries for which information is available, 
in general debt levels have fallen across the board in the past 
few years. In 2011, a number of countries —the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Paraguay and Peru— had public debt levels of 
less than 30% of GDP and others —the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia— were close 
to the regional average. The remainder —Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama 
and Uruguay— still showed levels which, although not 
especially high, were above the average for the region. 
The fiscal policies in place in the region suggest that the 
downward trend should continue in the next few years. 
In fact, all the projections indicate a regional average of 
around 30% of GDP by 2015. The situation is different for 
the great majority of the Caribbean countries, where public 
debt represents over 70% of GDP on average, except in the 
Bahamas, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 ■ One way of illustrating the fiscal space available is to calculate 
sustainability indicators. The simplest of these is the primary 
balance that would be needed to stabilize public debt as a 
percentage of GDP. The figure shows the difference between 
the actual primary balance in 2011 and the primary balance 
that would be needed to kept debt levels constant in 2012. 
This indicator thus measures, in GDP points, the leeway 
countries have to increase spending or forgo revenues in 
order to provide economic stimulus, without increasing the 
economy´s public debt burden.
 ■ Naturally, the countries with a larger overall deficit also show 
a positive gap between the actual primary balance and that 
needed to stabilize the debt. Thus, Costa Rica, Honduras and 
El Salvador would have to make a “fiscal effort” of around 
3 GDP points to achieve a primary balance compatible with the 
target of stabilizing the public debt to GDP ratio. Conversely, 
Chile, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are running 
large enough primary surpluses to keep reducing their public 
debt in 2012 and still have large fiscal spaces. 
 ■ An alternative methodology is to adopt a common debt 
standard or rule, as in ECLAC (2012). If 40% of GDP is 
taken as a standard, the exercise shows a larger fiscal space 
available, as depicted in the figure. This is because most of 
the countries had debt levels well below the 40% standard 
in 2011 and can, therefore, finance short-term fiscal stimulus 
packages through borrowing.4
 ■ As noted and as these figures show, many of the region’s 
countries are well placed to deploy countercyclical monetary 
and fiscal policies to deal with temporary lulls in aggregate 
demand. As a result, starting in 2008, for the first time ever 
fiscal policy became a key instrument of macroeconomic 
stabilization for the governments of the region. If forecasts 
for a long period of low growth are borne out, however, 
the scope of countercyclical fiscal policy will be limited, 
necessarily temporary and short-term. The singular success 
of countercyclical fiscal policy in the region in 2009 must not 
be allowed to overshadow the other (and no less important) 
functions of fiscal policymaking, such as the provision of 
public goods, the redistribution of available income and the 
promotion of long-run growth (see ECLAC, 2010). On this 
last point, the vulnerabilities arising from the concentration 
of production and exports in a few primary goods —the 
reprimarization of the economies of the region— seem to 
represent an obvious Achilles’ heel for several countries’ 
fiscal sectors in the event of a turnaround in the favourable 
terms of trade they have enjoyed in recent years.
4 These indicators are intended merely to illustrate the effort needed 
or the fiscal space available in the short term, not the probability or 
feasibility of debt stabilization, since they do not take into account 
the countries’ particular objectives (which may be other than debt 
stabilization) or potential changes in financing conditions. Furthermore, 
the gross debt indicator used does not include available financial 
assets, which are considerable in some countries, notable examples 
being Peru’s Fiscal Stabilization Fund and Chile’s Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund.
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 Figure 46  
Latin America: gap between the primary balance needed  































































































































Fiscal effort needed (positive gap)
(left scale)
Fiscal space available (negative gap)
(left scale)
Public debt in percentages
of GDP (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
 Figure 47  
Latin America: gap between the primary balance needed  
to stabilize the debt at 40% of gdp in 2012 and the actual  
primary balance in 2011





























































































































Public debt target in percentages
of GDP (right scale)
Fiscal effort needed (positive gap)
(left scale)
Fiscal space available (negative gap)
(left scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of official figures.
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35.
 ■ Global economic growth could slow further in the second 
half of 2012 and into 2013. Although United Nations 
projections at July 2012 show the world economy growing by 
2.8% in 2012 and 2.5% in 2013, subsequent events are likely 
to prompt fresh downward revisions. Deterioration in the 
euro zone economy and difficulties in finding effective routes 
out of the debt crisis in Southern European economies are 
worsening volatility and uncertainty in financial markets. 
As a result, cross-border and interbank credit lines have 
been shrinking in Europe, especially for the most heavily 
indebted economies, making the adjustment even more 
difficult. Regulators in the more solvent European economies 
are putting pressure on local banks to raise their capital and 
liquidity provisions to increase preparedness for a possible 
break-up of the euro, at the cost of limiting their exposure 
in Mediterranean countries. And since so much of Europe’s 
trade is conducted within the region exports from the entire 
euro zone are suffering. These processes are filtering through 
the channels of trade and finance and beginning to act as a 
drag on growth in other regions of the world. 
 ■ The efforts to defend the euro and European integration more 
broadly are highly complex—technically, institutionally 
and politically. The sheer scale of the debt crisis in the euro 
area now precludes any sort of temporary fix or low-cost 
solution. In fact, the crisis has been worsened precisely 
by partial policy measures, which have further raised the 
technical and political goal posts. The main lines of policy 
action now needed to tackle the euro zone crisis include:
• Providing the necessary liquidity to the most indebted 
economies at rates compatible with long-term equilibrium. 
• Restructuring public and bank debt and shutting down 
insolvent institutions, with support from the bailout 
funds available from the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF).
• Definitive separation of banks and sovereign entities in 
strategies for exit from the crisis.
• Limited mutualization of debt through euro bond issues.
Conclusions  and recommendations
• Fast-tracking of banking union, with Europe-wide conso-
lidated supervision and deposit guarantees, at least up to 
certain thresholds, in order to avoid massive bank runs.
• Progress towards fiscal union, with credible medium-
term fiscal consolidation schedules that will allow for 
fiscal policies to provide short-term stimulus.4
• A growth pact which must also be credible and capable 
of having an immediate impact.
 ■ In the United States, complex negotiations are approaching in 
late 2012 over fiscal and public debt dilemmas, immediately 
after the presidential elections in November. Without 
agreements in those areas, the United States economy could 
slip back in to recession in the first quarter of 2013. In this 
scenario, the slacker economic activity in the United States 
and the European Union would impact heavily on world 
economic growth and act as a drag on the economies of 
China and other developing countries.5
 ■ Economic growth projections for China stand at around 
8%. Exports, imports and manufacturing production are all 
slowing, partly because of the difficulties in the European 
Union, China’s main export market. Within China’s domestic 
market, inflationary pressures and real estate bubbles appear to 
be subsiding well and there is leeway for a more expansionary 
monetary and fiscal stance in the second half of 2012. Among 
other possible measures, fresh cuts are expected in interest 
rates and bank reserve requirements, as well as tax breaks to 
stimulate consumption and special credit schemes for SMEs.
 ■ The main impacts of international trends are likely to be 
transmitted to Latin America and the Caribbean through 
the trade channel, as external demand for the region’s goods 
4 The evidence from recoveries from previous recessions caused by 
financial crises suggests that fiscal austerity must be imposed after 
recovery, not before. Immediate fiscal austerity makes for a much slower 
recovery and at a far higher cost in terms of growth, employment and 
social impact.
5 It is worth recalling that the United States and Europe account, in similar 
proportions, for US$ 20 trillion of global consumption, whereas China 
accounts for only US$ 2 trillion. In other words, Chinese consumption 
would have to rise tenfold to offset lower consumption in Europe and 
the United States (Matthijs, 2012).
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and services exports wanes and raw materials prices slip. 
A worsening financial situation in the European periphery 
and harsher adjustments in emerging Asia are eroding trade 
flow momentum and international commodity prices. These 
trends are already having an impact on Latin America and 
the Caribbean. In this context, ECLAC projects that the 
region’s export values will edge up just 5%, 18 percentage 
points below their 2011 growth. 
 ■ The combination of the complex international situation and 
developments in individual countries weighed on economic 
activity in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout 
2011. The slowdown came to a halt in the first quarter 
of 2012 but resumed in the second, signalling a potential 
scenario in which growth could be slower than in the past 
for a prolonged period. It is therefore estimated that, at 
3.2%, the region’s economy will expand less than in 2011.
 ■ In the first semester of 2012, external financial conditions 
remained marred by turbulence arising from the problems 
several euro zone countries were having in meeting sovereign 
debt obligations. This has gradually pushed up the perception 
of sovereign risk for Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
In this new setting, with few exceptions, the countries of 
the region continued to strengthen their external positions 
by building up international reserves.
 ■ In this highly uncertain international environment, caution 
has guided monetary policy management, particularly 
in the face of high perceived volatility in the global 
financial market. Most of the region’s central banks have 
kept their policy rates steady; any changes have tended to 
be downward. Domestic credit continues to swell in most 
of the countries of the region, although more slowly in the 
first two quarters of 2012 in several countries.
 ■ In 2012 the overall fiscal balance for the region is expected 
to improve slightly on average, with revenues still rising 
above the rate of GDP growth and expenditure growth tending 
to slacken. The primary balance (before interest payments) is 
therefore expected to turn positive again. Public revenues have 
recovered strongly in much of the region in the past few years 
and have regained pre-crisis levels in many countries. If raw 
material prices continue to drop, the effects may be felt in the 
first semester of 2013 in countries whose revenue relies heavily 
on direct taxation of private mining and drilling enterprises.
 ■ With certain exceptions, the countries have enough fiscal 
space to weather fresh adverse scenarios. The difficult external 
situation has not yet affected the ongoing consolidation of 
the public accounts, inasmuch as public debt continues to 
decline in GDP terms and the domestic proportion of debt 
financing is still rising. This is not the case in the great 
majority of the Caribbean countries, however, where public 
debt still represents a large percentage of GDP.
 ■ Many countries in the region are well placed to deploy 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies to cushion 
the impact of temporary external shocks on aggregate 
demand. Starting in 2008, fiscal policy became an important 
instrument of macroeconomic stabilization in the region. 
However, if forecasts for a long period of low growth are 
borne out, the scope of countercyclical fiscal policy will be 
limited. In addition, net commodity exporters are fiscally 
vulnerable to a change in the favourable terms of trade 
which have prevailed in several countries of the region. 
 ■ For the medium term, the industrialized countries (the 
“North”) are likely to remain locked into a pattern of low 
growth, while the developing countries (the “South”) 
will experience a slight slowdown. All the agencies which 
forecast these data suggest that the United States will be 
the best performer in the developed world. Among the 
developing countries, China will continue to be the fastest-
growing economy this decade. In 2011-2017, the Asian region 
is forecast to contribute half of global growth. The Latin 
American and Caribbean region will contribute just over 
8.3%, slightly more than Western Europe and almost twice 
as much as Africa. The industrialized countries overall will 
contribute less than a third. 
 ■ The developing countries will also be more dynamic in terms 
of world trade and FDI. The weight of the developing countries 
in global exports has risen strongly since the mid-1980s. If the 
growth rates of the various categories of trade flows for the 
past decade are extrapolated for the next few years, South-
South trade may account for a greater proportion of world 
trade than North-North trade by around 2017. Similarly, over 
half of inward global FDI flows went to developing countries 
in 2011 and this share is likely to continue until 2014.
 ■ The sharp contrast between slowdown in the industrialized 
economies and steady growth, albeit not as strong as in 
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2003-2007, in the developing economies raises the question 
of how far this decoupling can go. Projections confirm that 
growth will continue to be driven by emerging economies, 
with China and East Asia, in particular, pulling along the 
rest of the developing world, given China’s increasing trade 
links with the rest of Asia and with Africa and Latin America. 
However, the magnitude of the decoupling is limited. In 
the first semester of 2012, in fact, exports from emerging 
economies were already slackening considerably, reflecting 
the direct impacts of the slowdown in Europe and the United 
States as well as the indirect effects of these slowdowns on 
China’s exports and of these, in turn, on China’s imports of 
raw materials. At the same time, risk aversion is prompting 
financial flight to United States and German sovereign bonds, 
squeezing the financing available for trade in the euro area 
and worsening the drag of weaker European growth on trade. 
Financing for commodity trade, in any case, relies heavily on 
European financial agents which —facing capital and liquidity 
exigencies of their own— are diverting resources from such 
financing and adding another brake to global trade growth.
 ■ The world economy’s current slowdown is cyclical and 
the lowest points will be in 2012 and 2013, when emerging 
economy growth will be affected too. The emerging 
economies may regain faster growth tracks starting in 2014, 
although at rates lower than in 2003-2007. In this connection, 
raising future potential growth will take major efforts to rise 
to the supply side challenges of productivity, innovation, 
education, infrastructure, logistics and transport.
 ■ This major transformation of the world economy challenges 
the region to rethink its international positioning strategies 
and global partnership schemes. Latin America and the 
Caribbean must continue to strengthen linkages with other 
developing regions, particularly Asia-Pacific, the main hub 
of world economic growth. Growth in Asia, and China 
in particular, has given the region resilience and growth 
capacity. It has also raised major challenges, such as resisting 
the temptation to entrench an export pattern based on 
natural resources with little processing (in the case of South 
America) and diversifying Mexico’s and Central America’s 
manufacturing exports away from the United States market. 
The region must therefore seek a modality of participating 
in the global economy in which it can maximize the benefits 
of its growing linkages with Asia and other developing 
regions, while also reducing the related costs.
 ■ The principal challenge lying ahead of the region is an 
internal one: how to tie the domestic innovation and 
competitiveness agenda in with the renewed economic 
linkages with the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, more 
innovation and knowledge must be embedded into exports 
to avoid over-reprimarization. This calls for active supply 
side policies to drive gains in productivity, innovation, 
infrastructure, transport, logistics and skills. There is scope 
to build a regional cooperation agenda with China and 
other key Asia-Pacific actors in all these areas. The region 
must therefore work to craft a prompt and coordinated 
response to the proposal made by China’s Prime Minister, 
Wen Jiabao, in his recent remarks at ECLAC in reference 
to a varied cooperation agenda between China and Latin 
America. The recent meeting of the troika of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean Sates (CELAC) with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of China should certainly provide interesting inputs 
for progress in that direction.
 ■ More and better cooperation and regional integration 
would be a very useful stepping stone for improving both 
the region’s economic growth outlook and its international 
linkages. Joint regional or subregional initiatives on innovation, 
competitiveness, infrastructure and sustainability, including 
for combating climate change, would leverage the contribution 
of national public policies to development. By tapping these 
areas of potential, the countries of the region could generate 
attractive trade and investment opportunities that would 
stimulate intraregional trade and help build up regional value 
chains. With broader regional markets and gradual convergence 
of rules, the region would be well placed to attract more FDI, 
diversify its exports and improve the quality of its trade ties 
with China and Asia-Pacific in general. Major synergies exist 
between the two strategies proposed here: strengthening 
regional integration, on the one hand, and building up linkages 
with other developing regions, on the other. 
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